Harm minimisation has been proposed as a means of supporting people who self-injure. When adopting this approach, rather than trying to stop self-injury immediately the person is allowed to injure safely whilst developing more appropriate ways of dealing with distress. The approach is controversial as the health care professional actively allows harm to occur. This paper will consider a specific objection to harm minimisation. That is, it is a misguided collaboration between the health care professional and the person who self-injures that is morally and clinically questionable. The objection has two components. The first component is moral in nature and asserts that the health care professional is complicit in any harm that occurs and as a result they can be held morally responsible and subject to moral blame. The second component is clinical in nature and suggests that harm minimisation involves the health care professional in colluding in the perpetuation of self-injury. This element of the objection is based on a psychodynamic understanding of why selfinjury occurs and it is argued that harm minimisation is merely a mechanism for avoiding thinking about the psychotherapeutic issues that need to be addressed. Thus, the health care professional merely reinforces a dysfunctional pattern of behaviour and supports the perpetuation of self-injury. I will consider this objection and argue that it fails on both counts. I conclude that the use of harm minimisation techniques is an appropriate form of intervention that is helpful to certain individuals in some situations.
Introduction
Although it is generally accepted that current approaches to supporting people who self-injure require improvement, an alternative presented by the use of harm minimisation approaches is controversial. When adopting this approach, rather than trying to stop selfinjury immediately, the person is allowed to injure safely whilst working to develop more appropriate ways of dealing with distress. There is some support for the approach in the literature. 1, 2 However, it has also been subject to challenge. 3, 4 This paper will consider a specific objection to harm minimisation. That is, it is merely a misguided collaboration between the health care professional and the person who self-injures that is morally and clinically questionable. I will argue that the argument fails and that the use of harm minimisation techniques is an appropriate form of intervention that is helpful to certain individuals in some situations.
In the first part of the paper, I will make some preliminary comments about the nature of self-injury and show how the current clinical response is inadequate. I will then explain how harm minimisation should be understood and how it is applied in the context of self-injury. I will then consider the objection. This objection has both moral and clinical components. By responding to these components, a more robust understanding of these complex issues will emerge. The paper will focus on current practice within the context of the United Kingdom and reference will be made to the legal framework operating in England and Wales. The arguments do however have a wider application.
Self-injury
Self-injury is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that remains poorly understood. For this reason, it is often difficult to identify the specific motivation and reasons for a particular act of self-injury since one individual may self-injure for a number of different reasons or purposes. In his detailed analysis of the phenomena, Favazza 5 suggested there are in fact four different types of self-injury: stereotypic, major, compulsive, and impulsive. The focus of my analysis is on what Favazza refers to as impulsive self-injury. These are actions defined in terms of the following components. First, the deliberate, direct, and self-inflicted destruction of body tissue. Second, the action results in immediate tissue damage. Third, it occurs for purposes not socially sanctioned and finally there is no suicidal intent. 6 This type is the most prevalent form of selfinjury and may take many forms. For some people it is a regular occurrence and has an almost addictive quality. 7, 8 It could be objected at this point that this is an oversimplification and such an objection must to some extent be accepted. People do not fit easily into broad classificatory systems and their motives are often difficult to understand without detailed assessment of the specific clinical situation. For example, in some cases, the behaviour may be associated with mental disorder and the underlying illness will require treatment. 9 In other cases it may be a unique response to a particular life situation, a response that is about survival rather than destruction of the self. 10 Some people who selfinjure will not have insight into the full reasons for their behavior, 11 and others may be ambivalent about whether their injury leads to death. All forms of self-injury are dangerous and harmful in the longer term. For example, acts such as cutting may result in scarring, numbness, or paralysis. 12 Furthermore, although self-injury appears to be psychologically and phenomenologically different from suicide and the current risk of suicide may be low, the lifetime risk of suicide is increased. 13, 14 Due to these risks, the traditional approach to intervention is to try and get the person to stop. Within an inpatient mental health unit this may involve trying to stop the behaviour occurring through strategies such as continuous observation, the use of searches, the removal of personal possessions, and in some cases the use of restraint and detention under the Mental Health Act. As we shall see these interventions are perceived as intrusive and coercive and are experienced negatively by the person to whom they are applied. Paradoxically they may increase the level of risk. 15, 16 It is my contention that where self-injury is carried out without suicidal intent, in some circumstances, harm minimisation may be a safer option in trying to help the person to change.
Harm minimisation
Harm minimisation is an option to support people who self-injure. It is an alternative approach that is developed in response to the views of those with lived experience of self-injury. [17] [18] [19] Personal narratives supported by more phenomenological academic accounts of self-injury have facilitated a greater understanding of the meaning associated with this phenomenon. 20 They provide what Schweiger 21 terms 'windows into reality'. In these accounts the meaning of self-injury is considered to be part of a person's identity, whereby the body represents what the person feels on the inside. Its function is a means of reducing the experience of overwhelming stress. A number of psychological accounts of the phenomenon have also confirmed its value as a coping strategy. [22] [23] [24] A number of health care professionals have accepted this narrative and frustrated with traditional ways of working with people who self-injure have promoted the use of harm minimisation techniques. [25] [26] [27] This involves allowing the individual to injure him or herself safely. This focus on reducing rather than eliminating harm has been used in a range of different contexts, substance misuse services being the obvious example. 28 This is an alternative to traditional approaches that attempt to stop the individual from sustaining any injury. Rather than using more restrictive and preventative measures, harm minimisation is based on the idea that self-injury is allowed as long as it is practiced safely. It is a means of supporting the person whilst they develop a different range of coping strategies in the longer term. 29 The approach is recognised as a valid form of intervention by NICE guidance, although they do not suggest it is an approach that can be universally applied. It may be a necessary and proportionate intervention where other approaches have not been successful and immediate cessation of self-injury is not possible. 30, 31 The adoption of harm minimisation is recognition that self-injury has a function in helping the individual to deal with distress.
An objection
In supporting harm minimisation both moral and clinical arguments are engaged. The moral argument is that by attempting to prevent harm occurring it is necessary to use a range of restrictive interventions that infringe on the person's autonomy. Given that in some cases the person's autonomy may not be jeopardised in any relevant way, these attempts at prevention may be an example of strong paternalism and be morally questionable. The clinical argument is that these attempts at prevention may not work and paradoxically lead to an increase in the level of risk as the person, desperate to self-injure, resorts to more extreme methods to achieve his or her goal. Furthermore, the relationship between the health care professionals and the patient deteriorates in ways that may be detrimental to the person's safety. The ethical argument is thus based on the view that if you cannot achieve the good, we should at least attempt to reduce the bad. The clinical argument is based on the view that allowing harm to occur in a controlled way is safer and overall the risks are reduced, particularly as by engaging the person who self-injures in a therapeutic way, there is a greater chance of involving the person in psychological treatments that may facilitate change.
The objection considered in this paper is directed at both the moral and clinical components of this argument. First, by allowing harm to occur the health care professional is complicit in supporting a wrong. Harm minimisation involves the health care professional participating in a process that allows harm to occur and in acting in such a way the health care professional acts contrary to their moral and professional obligation to prevent harm. Thus it is not the right thing to do for moral reasons and as a consequence they can be held morally responsible and subject to moral blame.
The second component is clinical in nature and is based on the work of Scanlon and Adlam. 3 They question the practice of harm minimisation on clinical grounds and argue that harm minimisation involves the health care professional colluding in the perpetuation of self-injury. Their objection is based on a psychodynamic understanding of why self-injury occurs. They argue that harm minimisation is merely a mechanism to avoid thinking about the psychotherapeutic issues that need to be addressed in working with people who self-injure. By their actions the health care professional merely reinforces a dysfunctional pattern of behaviour and supports the perpetuation of selfinjury. Thus, it is not the right thing to do for clinical reasons. I will argue that this argument succeeds in emphasising the importance of a psychologically informed approach to working with self-injury but fails by taking a limited perspective regarding harm minimisation as an approach.
A moral objection?
In any relationship, Gardiner 32 has argued, there are two parts to morality, what I should do, and what I should do by way of contribution to what you do. So the health care professional is responsible for the actions they take and the person who self-injures is also responsible for their actions. However, the former must consider consequences of their actions upon the latter. It is within this relationship that harm occurs. Mellema 33 argues that actions may enable harm or they may facilitate harm, where harm is enabled the health care professionals action constitutes a necessary condition for the harm to occur. Facilitating harm is a weaker notion than enabling harm and merely makes it more likely that harm will occur. I take harm to be a setback of interests and return to this issue below. 34 When supporting a person to continue to self-injure, albeit safely, the health care professional enables harm. It could be argued that by supporting the person in this way, the health care professional by their actions or omissions harms the person and thus the individual's interests are thwarted and he or she is wronged. 34 This is because there are strong moral and legal reasons against allowing harm and generally it is accepted that where an individual is subject to harm then others have reasons to prevent it from occurring. 35 Health professionals particularly have a specific responsibility to do no harm based on the concept of 'primum non nocere'. 36 When using a harm minimisation approach instruments that may be used for selfinjury may be provided or not removed and the health care professional and the patient cooperate and work collaboratively to ensure that self-injury occurs in a safer way. Therefore, it cannot be denied that injury and therefore harm occurs.
In allowing a person to inflict wounds on their body we enable harm. Furthermore, the wounds may become infected and there are dangers from longer term problems associated with scar tissue and muscle damage. In allowing such injuries to occur it could be argued that the health care professional acts in a way that is contrary to a moral obligation to do no harm. He or she acts wrongly as their actions and/or omissions not only fail to prevent harm but actually enable harm. As a result they are morally blameworthy. I am going to show that this argument is unsubstantiated.
In an institutional setting attempts are made to stop self-injury occurring and such interventions, as I will show below, are by their very nature restrictive. So whereas harm minimisation raises a number of ethical questions, traditional approaches raise others, which are not ethically neutral. In particular, traditional approaches raise serious moral questions as the person is harmed through direct infringements on important interests such as autonomy, privacy, bodily integrity, dignity, and liberty. 37 The impact of continuous observation illustrates this point.
Continuous observation is by its nature highly intrusive, as a person is observed throughout the 24 h period and all activities are subject to the professional gaze. One is reminded of an interesting comparison with the work of Bell 38 who writes in relation to the inpatient treatment of eating disorders. She identified parallels between the protocols governing these interventions and the Foucaultian idea of panoptic disciplinary power. She emphasises the processes of surveillance and routinisation that aims to enhance the control of the patient by the health care professional. This analysis could equally be applied to the use of continuous observation. Moreover, the actual process of observation is often undertaken by very junior staff and follows a set procedure. This has to be followed, clearly documented, and is subject to audit. The recipient often experiences the process as coercive and intrusive and it has been described as akin to 'watching' rather than as a form of therapeutic engagement. 39 From a clinical perspective questions also arise as research suggests continuous observation does not always work. There are two problems. First, it may not in fact prevent harm as the risk of harm increases when such intrusive methods are used. People become increasingly distressed and may attempt to use more dangerous means to self-injure. 40 Second, it has also been shown to have a negative impact on the therapeutic relationship. 41 This does not mean there is no place for such a process, for example in cases where the person is actively suicidal and their actions life threatening then such an intervention can be justified on the balance of harms and benefits.
Thus whether we are considering these traditional measures, or an alternative harm minimisation, balancing harms and benefits is crucial to the argument. The idea of a harm and benefits ratio is fundamental to clinical decision making and health care interventions may both harm and benefit the patient. 42 The judgement of whether harm minimisation is a positive strategy is based on a comparison of the actual injury incurred set against the longer term benefits of the intervention. Thus, the person who self-injures is prima facie worse off due to the injuries incurred but better off overall due to an increased possibility that harm will be reduced in the long term.
If harm minimisation is to be defended as a legitimate intervention then the harm incurred must occur in the person's interests. It is possible to imagine a scenario where it is permissible to allow a person to cut him or herself safely in order to prevent the use of more unsafe actions or even an escalation of risks through the adoption of more dangerous forms of harm such as the use of ligatures. Pembroke, 17 writing from the perspective of someone with lived experience of self-injury, notes that the majority of health risks associated with self-injury relate to the dangers of permanent injury or infection. For example, the risk of infection due to using dirty cutting instruments. She goes on to point out that harm minimisation approaches are specifically designed to reduce risks of this sort by promoting safer means of self-injury. This is achieved by ensuring the individual is informed about basic anatomy and physiology and is able to access first aid and use the correct dressings. If this information is not available then the individual's choices about self-injury are restricted in a way that makes self-injury less safe. She concludes by stating that she has yet to hear someone who selfinjures say they want to lose a hand or arm and yet she had seen this occur in situations where the individual lacked basic knowledge of anatomy and physiology. In essence what is observed is an agreed level of injury that is in fact negotiated with the person and based on a therapeutic understanding of what is allowed.
The moral argument supporting such an approach is that although the health care professional does not want harm to occur, in cooperating with the person in allowing this harm to occur, a greater harm was prevented by assisting in the production of a lesser harm. This type of argument has been developed in a number of settings and Mellema 33 explains how this moral phenomenon may occur in in a situation where the person 'perceives that the only way to prevent a great harm from occurring is to assist in the production of a lesser harm'. At this point I return to the conceptual framework developed by Feinberg 34 and suggest that it provides a conceptual lens through which to view harm minimisation.
My underlying argument is based on an attempt to balance harms and benefits, with the former perceived as bad and the latter perceived as good. Harms setback a person's interests, in this case by infringing upon their autonomy. Benefits enhance a person's interests, in this case, their health and well-being. In evaluating harm minimisation we must consider whether the person's interests are better at the end of the process than they were at the start or how they would have been if the process had not been followed. The comparison of harms and benefits results in an evaluation of whether the person has been harmed or benefited. In my view the moral arguments developed are similar to those employed by Feinberg 34 in his rescue case. He argues that in spite of having his arm broken when rescued the individual was not harmed given the overriding benefits he experienced when being saved.
We do not have to go far to see this principle applied in health care, as it is not an unusual scenario, surgery being the obvious example. Harman 43 makes the moral argument when she makes the point that we would accept that in normal circumstances the doctor does not harm the patient. However, she goes on to say that what a doctor does often results in harm. The use of a scalpel to cut the skin being an example. She argues that the statement that the doctor does not do harm is a means of justifying the permissibility of their action. It is therefore a rhetorical device. Harman deals with this by suggesting that an alternative means of examining the actions of the health care professional is to accept that harm occurs and that in some circumstances this may cause significant damage to an individual's body. In surgery the damage to the body has a purpose. The harm resulting from the actual surgical intervention is weighed against the harm that would result if such an intervention did not take place. Harman suggests that the reasons for performing the surgery are stronger than the reasons for not performing the surgery. As a result the surgery is permissible. In this sense something that would constitute a crime in a different context is perceived as a legitimate medical treatment. The harm experienced is outweighed by the benefits received and the moral argument is made.
I conclude that harm minimisation can be justified in a moral sense. Although the person may be harmed in a narrow sense that is through cutting their skin for example, they are not harmed in a more global sense as we respect their autonomy in a way that more paternalistic interventions do not. By allowing harm to occur in a controlled and safe way, a greater harm is prevented by avoiding the possibility that more risky means will be used to inflict self-injury. There is thus a net reduction in harm. As a consequence on balance the health care professional is morally justified in allowing harm and as such cannot be subject to moral blame. However, things do not end there and there is an equally important and related objection that needs to be addressed from a clinical perspective. This concern evolves from the work of Scanlon and Adlam. 3 It is to their concern that we now turn.
A clinical objection?
In an analysis of self-injury, undertaken from a psychodynamic perspective, Scanlon and Adlam 44 deal with the issue of harm minimisation only briefly but provide a serious criticism of the approach from a specific clinical perspective. They question the ethics of harm minimisation by challenging its clinical validity. They argue that harm minimisation reflects a failure to deal with important and underlying therapeutic issues.
The understanding of self-injury proposed by Scanlon and Adlam, 3 argues that self-injury is a defence against internalised threats to psychological functioning that must be controlled. If this fails it may result dysfunctional behaviour. The response of health care professionals, they argue, is based on a view that the person's actions are both deliberate and rational. This results in professionals judging the behaviour in negative terms and responding to the person's actions in ways that can be thoughtless and punishing. 45 The patient is therefore humiliated and as a result the person who self-injures and the health care professional become locked in a reciprocal relationship whereby both parties ask 'why do you treat me this way'? 46 These professional attitudes are pervasive given society's inability to understand why another human being would want to damage their own body. It is a phenomenon that is contrary to shared ideas about health and well-being. 47 Through the means of unconscious collusion, both the patient and the practitioner avoid confronting the reciprocal violence engrained in their relationship. By attributing intentionality to the action the system of care perceives the person's actions in terms of wrongdoing and effectively punishes the patient by its actions. 48 An extreme example of this is the provision of sterile cutting instruments as part of a harm minimisation. To use the authors actual words, such an approach Invites the clinician into an active collusion with the perpetration of a 'crime against the body' or into the negotiation of an acceptable level of violence, in ways that would not be accommodated if this was a crime against someone else's body. 44 The health care practitioner colludes with what Scanlon and Adlam term, 'active or more passiveaggressive positions of societal sadism, from within which we give razorblades to 'them' because we really do not care enough to think with 'them' about their relationship with 'us'.' 49 The language used by Scanlon and Adlam is important. The term collusion is used in a very specific sense. When a therapeutic encounter is understood using a psychodynamic model, the focus will be on both the person and the therapist and refers to a subconscious process whereby staff and patients avoid addressing painful issues that need to be addressed as part of the therapeutic encounter. As a result both parties become stuck in a pattern of behaviours that merely perpetuates the status quo. 50 The use of the term 'crimes against the body' is also used in a very specific way. Motz 51 originally used the term in her work on female violence, which makes use of the conceptual model developed by Welldon, 52 which is based on the idea of 'female perversion'. She developed her ideas to help understand the psychology of women who commit violent acts either on others or themselves. This term, when used correctly, describes instances of human behaviour that deviate from what is considered normal. Welldon's work includes reference to different forms of violent behaviour, of which violence directed against a women's own body is one. Motz 53 has developed these ideas and argues that such actions are a form of communication that is indicative of internal pain and she uses the term 'crimes' in both a literal and metaphorical sense. It is in the latter sense that Scanlon and Adlam apply the term and theirs is a broader discussion, as their analysis is not only confined to women. The use of language and the context from which it originates, places their analysis of self-injury, like that of Motz and Welldon, firmly within a psychodynamic model. As a result their understanding of self-injury and the approach to intervention is explained using this model. In a general sense, this type of analysis helps to describe some of the complex dynamics in play between health care professionals and people who self-injure. Self-injury is hard to understand and it is not difficult to identify reasons why people become concerned and even disturbed by acts of self-injury. Intuitively most people would want to prevent injury occurring. However, people who self-injure not only allow injury to occur, but also they inflict such injury on themselves. 54 This challenges and disturbs the notion, which Kristeva 55 describes as the 'self propre'. By this I understand her to mean a clean, proper, and selfcontained body. Many types of ill health or disease challenge this notion and it is within this context that Kristeva makes her argument regarding abjection. These are phenomena that disturb the social order and deeply held communal values. This idea is relevant to self-injury, as by disrupting the 'self propre' a person who self-injures challenges societal ideas about what is acceptable and goes against accepted social norms in a way that we find difficult to understand.
As a consequence, when faced with a person who has inflicted wounds upon their body, most people including health care professionals will feel different emotions. These range from pity and sympathy, on the one hand, to fear and shock, on the other hand. The nature of the injuries themselves may disturb and it can be difficult to feel empathy in such situations. This coexistence of positive and negative emotions often results in very different views about the best way of supporting individuals who self-injure. As Rozien 56 has pointed out, when we fail to understand something, we will try to impose meaning upon the unknown. Certain actions may acquire a moral content as they are linked with our values as individuals, as members of society or as health care professionals. This has direct implications for people who self-injure.
In their analysis of these emotions in the context of a therapeutic relationship, Scanlon and Adlam, allude to the complex emotions that come into play and like Nussbaum 57 appear to suggest the presence of an unease that may be due to an unconscious fear of contamination and a need to differentiate us from the object of our concern and this is played out in a moral way. When this occurs health care professionals perceive the person to be different from themselves and understanding their perspective becomes difficult. Furthermore, because the person's actions are contrary to society's norms they become stigmatised both through the act of cutting and literally through the scars that demonstrate their difference. The person's identity is therefore defined in terms of their self-injury.
In a clinical setting, the fact that the person who selfinjures may be seen by the health care professional to be intrinsically different is important. They may find it difficult to feel empathy with the person's means of coping with their distress and this impacts on the development of an effective therapeutic relationship. This is not a criticism of health care professionals as this need to differentiate between 'them and us' often operates at an unconscious level. The health care professional may want to help but finds it difficult to have empathy with the person who is in front of them, bleeding from wounds that they have inflicted upon themselves. They cannot understand why this has happened. This is illustrated by negative attitudes and prejudicial judgements about the person who has self-injured. Stereotypical perceptions of people who self-injure are illustrated through the use of prejudicial language. People who self-injure may be described as manipulative or attention seeking, just another 'cutter'. The health care professional may inadvertently condemn both the action and the person themselves, speaking disparagingly of the 'behaviour' and the need for it to be 'managed'. Even brief, everyday interactions, may send out these negative messages which impact on the development of any type of therapeutic relationship. 58 Why do you treat me this way? Is the title of Scanlon and Adlams paper, and that the way people who selfinjure are treated need to change, is part of Scanlon and Adlams argument. However, they see harm minimisation as part of the problem rather than a potential solution. It merely perpetuates this problem and fails to deal with the underlying therapeutic issues. In one sense they are right to make this point, as the current treatment of people who self-injure is inadequate. Empirical evidence would support this claim. 59 Furthermore, there is a deficit of psychological therapies available to people with mental health problems; this includes those who self-injure. As a result the focus of intervention is often based on the use of medication supported by efforts to contain the person's behaviour. As we have seen these measures are certainly restrictive and often perceived as coercive and intrusive. These measures are an adjunct to treatment and harm minimisation would also fall into this category. Where it differs is the overall ethos of the approach which is not just about keeping the person safe, although this is important, what it also does is to promote a more positive therapeutic relationship than is possible when more restrictive interventions are used.
Although harm minimisation is part of a therapeutic process, and although it is not a therapeutic intervention in its own right, it is a means to such an intervention. Progress is dependent on a certain type of moral and clinical relationship. Whilst an examination of the application of care ethics to the issues raised by selfinjury is beyond the scope of the current paper there are elements of this ethical approach that help us to consider the issues raised in a way that is helpful. It would be easy to adopt a principled approach to the ethical issues and develop a potentially unhelpful binary focused on the tension between autonomy and paternalism that pervades mental health care. Although this is important, it is more important to focus on the particularities of the situation and to consider what is right for the person. The right thing to do is what is right for the patient. 60 The moral question thus becomes one of how we best meet our caring responsibilities based on a detailed knowledge and understanding of the situation. 61 In some cases this will mean that harm minimisation becomes an option as it provides perhaps the only means of engaging the patient in a therapeutic process. In other cases it may not be an option given the patients particular needs, ability to engage in the process, and the risks involved. For example, where a person's autonomy is compromised, where their psychological distress has spiralled out of control, and/or when self-injury is used as a form of self-punishment or suicide is considered a possibility then harm minimisation will not be feasible. Where harm minimisation is an option, it is likely that that it provides the only means by which we can engage with the person on his or her own terms, by respecting the meaning that self-injury has for them and understanding that change is unlikely to occur without the active participation of the person who self-injures. By recognising the function self-injury serves for the person and developing a therapeutic relationship on this basis, a range of therapeutic possibilities may become available.
Thus, harm minimisation is more than keeping the person safe. Regardless of whether we are teaching people to cut themselves safely and in a sterile way, helping drug users to inject safely or supporting alcoholics to moderate their drinking, immediate safety is only a secondary objective (unless, as mentioned earlier, there was a significant imminent risk). The fundamental purpose of intervention is to help the person change. As McLeod and Sherwin 62 argue, in describing their work with women who abuse drugs, the therapeutic approach is always twofold, part of the work focusing on the problem area itself and the need to ensure the person is safe. The second part however is just as important and in McLeod and Sherwin's example this involved making space available to work with the women on areas such as self-esteem and self-respect. Harm minimisation mirrors this process.
An approach to harm minimisation that merely supported safer self-injury would be limited in its scope. Although it could be argued that safety in itself is a good thing, it is not enough. This is exactly what alternative and more traditional interventions are designed to do. Enabling harm without the longer term aim of reducing harm cannot be supported. A mere perpetuation of the status quo would raise obvious moral and clinical questions about the overall benefit and justifiability of the process. The approach has to be seen as a means to an end otherwise its very purpose is clinically and morally questionable. The harm allowed must be seen to support a greater good and that good is the development of alternative coping strategies that will ultimately reduce and even stop the behaviour in question.
A focus on the act of injury and the process of allowing this to occur fails to take into account the overall context and the person's wider interests. The overall approach is a means of supporting an individual whilst essential treatment and therapy is fully undertaken. This should include a range of interventions that facilitate engagement in different types of therapeutic support. When viewed in the round, harm minimisation is far more sophisticated and complex than is often acknowledged. In promoting safer selfinjury the importance of the self-injury as a coping strategy is both accepted and respected. In addition, therapeutic work is undertaken to replace this means of coping with more appropriate strategies. Different treatment and therapeutic interventions will be used depending on the needs of the individual. If harm minimisation does not facilitate such work, and in some cases it may not, then it cannot be considered as an option.
The ultimate aim is for self-injury to stop, but the rationale is about helping the person to stop not making them stop. The means of achieving this is through engaging the person in a therapeutic process that supports change and understanding. This is exactly what Scanlon and Adlam are promoting. Towards the conclusion of their paper they describe the use of reflective work with health care professionals to help them understand their relationship with the person in order to work therapeutically with the individual to understand their needs and to help them to change where this is required. Where I take issue with Scanlon and Adlam, is that although it is counterintuitive, there may be circumstances where we give razor blades to individuals' who self-injure. This is not only because we think that on balance this is the safest thing to do but as it allows health care professionals to develop a therapeutic position from where it is possible to explore and help change the reasons for the actions that threaten the individual's safety. It is a controversial means to a therapeutic end.
Conclusion
Supporting people who self-injure is an important issue for health care professionals working in mental health care. Sometimes restrictions on a person's liberty and choice may be justified and in other situations it is not. There may be occasions when such restrictions are necessary to ensure that people who injure are kept safe. Using harm minimisation approaches in helping people who self-injure brings this tension into clear focus. In allowing someone to continue to harm him or herself moral and clinical questions are asked and the approach is controversial.
This paper has considered a specific objection to harm minimisation. Namely, that the health care professional collaborates in a process that cannot be justified on moral or clinical grounds. I have considered whether in allowing harm the health care professional is complicit in an action that is morally questionable and as such morally blameworthy. Based on a consideration of the harms and benefits involved, it is argued that this argument fails. Harm minimisation offers a safe and proportionate means of providing support when set against the alternatives.
We have also seen that difficult questions can be asked about the approach from a therapeutic perspective. Is it merely a means of colluding with the person who self-injures, as Scanlon and Adlam suggest, merely perpetuating a dysfunctional behaviour, and avoiding addressing important psychological issues in order to promote change. It has been proposed that it is something more therapeutically acceptable, a means to a positive therapeutic end. We have seen that if harm minimisation focused only on safety it would have significant limitations. It is accepted that harm minimisation is not a treatment in its own right. It must be supported by psychological interventions based on the needs of the individual. It was then proposed that the argument that the health care professional merely colludes with the person ultimately fails as it is based on a limited perception of harm minimisation and fails to consider the importance of therapeutic interventions that promote change and recovery.
Finally, let us finish with reference to the real experts in this matter. We must not forget that harm minimisation was adopted in this area of clinical practice, through the influence of people who have lived experience of self-injury. Their voice has challenged more traditional approaches that emphasise the prevention of self-injury. In responding to this challenge health professionals have had to try and enter the psychological world of those who self-injure and to respond on the basis of what they have come to understand about its purpose and meaning. In responding to what they have learned they have tried to provide support in a way that is controversial and yet based on three underlying principles: safety, understanding, and compassion. In the final analysis we provide razor blades because we really do care enough to think about the person's welfare and their relationship with us.
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